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COMMENTARY:
THE FUTURE OF CALIFORNIA'S
BLUE SKY LAW
Therese H. Maynard*

I. INTRODUCrION
During the 1995-1996 Session of the California State Legislature, Keith Paul Bishop, the Commissioner of the Department of
Corporations (DOC),' introduced a proposal to reform California's Corporate Securities Law of 1968.2 Although this legislation
did not become law, it did generate considerable interest in a subject that had received scant attention in California despite numerous blue sky reform efforts undertaken by other states in recent
years. As a result of this newly awakened interest in reforming
California's blue sky statute, 4 committees in both houses of the
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. This Commentary has
benefited from the insightful comments of my colleagues Kathryn Tate, Keith Paul
Bishop, Blake Campbell, Robert Benfield, Karl Greissinger, and Janet Kerr. I would
like to thank Anastasia Liakas for her helpful research assistance and, as always,
Ruth Busch for her cheerful assistance in preparing this Commentary.
1. The DOC is headed by the Commissioner of Corporations (Commissioner),
who is charged with the administration of the California Corporate Securities Law of
1968, as well as various other state laws. For a detailed description of the DOC and
the general scope of this state agency's responsibilities in administering California's
blue sky law, see 1 HAROLD MARSH JR. & ROBERT H. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE

CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAWS § 2.01, at 2-3 to 2-24 (rev. ed. 1996).
2. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25022 (West 1977 & Supp. 1997).
3. See, e.g., infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (describing recent blue sky
reform measures adopted in other states).
4. The term "blue sky laws" refers to the securities laws of the 50 states. These
state laws have generally become known as blue sky laws as a result of an early Supreme Court opinion describing the primary purpose of these statutes as preventing
"'speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of "blue sky ....
Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917) (citation omitted in original); see
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state legislature conducted a joint interim hearing on November 78, 1996 (Joint Hearing).' The purpose of this Joint Hearing was to
provide the committee members with an opportunity to explore
the current framework of statutory and administrative requirements which the California law imposes on the capital formation
process in this state. During the course of this two-day Joint
Hearing, the committee members heard testimony from a diverse
group of individuals-all participants in California's capital formation process-including representatives of the following constituencies: entrepreneurs and other promoters of start-up business interests, large corporate issuers, small-business interests,
state regulators, banks and other sources of investment capital, investors, academics, 6 and other interested observers of the process
of capital formation in California. The diversity of the speakers
who testified clearly reflected the essential purpose of this Joint
Hearing: to offer California legislators important background information with which to make fully informed decisions as they assess the need for legislative reform of California's securities laws.
This Commentary offers my reflections on the need for revision of California's Corporate Securities Law of 1968. The time is
certainly ripe for this kind of thorough review, especially since
California's blue sky law has not been subject to such comprehensive scrutiny since the statute was originally adopted.7 More imalso Louis Loss & EDWARD M. CowETr, BLUE SKY LAW 7 (1958) (providing a survey of the blue sky laws of the fifty states as well as the text of the Uniform Securities Laws, official comments on the laws, and the draftsmen's commentary).
5. This interim hearing, held in Los Angeles, was conducted jointly by the Senate Finance, Investment and International Trade Committee, and the Assembly
Banking and Finance Committee. See CapitalFormation and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1996: Joint Hearingon AB 2465 Before the Senate Comm. on Fin.,
Inv. and Int'l Trade, and the Assembly Comm. on Banking and Fin., 1995-1996 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 1996) [hereinafter Joint Hearingon AB 2465].
6. I participated as a member of the opening panel on the first day of this Joint
Hearing. Other members of the opening panel were: Stuart Buchalter, Buchalter,
Nemer, Fields & Younger; Jere Glover, Federal Small Business Administration; and
Harold Marsh, Professor Emeritus of securities law at the University of California,
Los Angeles. This opening panel was asked to provide a general overview of the
current regulatory framework, including a brief historical and contemporary perspective on the regulatory process used in this state and general observations regarding the future of blue sky regulation. This Commentary elaborates in greater detail
on the views originally set forth in my testimony at the Joint Hearing.
7. California has not comprehensively examined the 1968 statute since its
adoption almost thirty years ago, despite this statute being subject to numerous
piecemeal amendments during this time period. See infra Part III (discussing some
of the important legal changes implemented over the course of the last fifteen years).
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portantly, however, dramatic changes have occurred over the last
twenty-five years in our nation's capital markets as well as in the
nature of the accompanying federal and state regulatory environments. Taken together, these changes call into question the continuing effectiveness of merit review, the regulatory philosophy
forming the basis for the 1968 statute.
As I testified at the Joint Hearing, these dramatic changes in
the financial markets and regulatory framework render merit review obsolete today. This Commentary elaborates on the reasoning I originally offered as part of my testimony in support of reforming California's blue sky statute. For the reasons set forth
below, the state legislature should reform California's blue sky
statute to eliminate merit review as the philosophical rpremise for
regulation of the capital formation process in this state.
This Commentary maintains that merit review has outgrown
whatever usefulness it may have had originally. Part II of this
Commentary provides a brief overview of the competing regulatory approaches in this area: California's merit review standard on
the one hand and, on the other hand, the disclosure philosophy
that lies at the heart of the federal securities laws.9 Part III ad8. This Commentary does not propose to offer a detailed description of the
specific provisions that should be included in any legislative proposal for reform of
California's blue sky statute. Rather, this Commentary analyzes the inadequacies
inherent in California's current system of merit regulation to support the ultimate
recommendation that California abandon blue sky regulation based on merit review.
9. The term "federal securities laws" generally refers to seven specific federal
statutes. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(47) (1994) (defining "securities laws" to include
these seven acts). Congress enacted the first six of these statutes between 1933 and
1940: Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811; Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15
U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6; Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb; Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64; and Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21. Congress enacted the seventh statute in 1970,
the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-78111 (1994).
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been delegated the
general authority of administering the various provisions of the federal securities
laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994) (providing for the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission and proscribing procedures for its establishment and requirements of its members). See generally RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 98-102 (7th ed. 1992) (discussing the SEC's
organizational structure and the scope of its responsibilities in administering the federal securities laws). The SEC is an independent, bipartisan, quasijudicial government agency, which is comprised of five members appointed by the President with
congressional approval. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) ("There is hereby established a Securities and Exchange Commission ...to be composed of five commissioners to be
appointed by the President ....Not more than three of such commissioners shall be
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vances the argument by describing several legal changes implemented over approximately the last fifteen years at both the state
and federal levels. This Part demonstrates that these legal changes
have substantially reduced the effectiveness of merit regulation.
Part IV explains why the Legislature's failure to eliminate merit
regulation does a disservice to both California business interests
and California investors. In light of the shortcomings of California's merit review approach to securities regulation, this Part concludes that California's scarce administrative resources would be
better utilized by concentrating them on efforts to enhance the
state's current enforcement activities. By doing so, the state would
be in a position to do that at which it can be most effective:
promptly detecting and swiftly punishing promoters of fraudulent
securities offerings.
In addition to an enhanced enforcement effort, state officials
should devote more administrative resources to the development
of programs to educate California investors so that they will be
better able to recognize the deceptive practices of unscrupulous
promoters before risking their life savings by investing in such
fraudulent offerings. Part V describes the three-pronged regulatory approach that should become the central focus of any effort to
reform California's blue sky statute. Finally, Part VI concludes by
urging California legislators to undertake a comprehensive review
of the existing blue sky requirements and, at a minimum, to reform
California's Corporate Securities Law of 1968 to eliminate merit
regulation.

II.

STATE MERIT REGULATION VS. THE FEDERAL DISCLOSURE
PHILOSOPHY

In general, federal securities laws and state blue sky laws require
an issuer to register its securities prior to sale.'" Both the federal
government and the states, however, have exempted certain types
of securities transactions from their respective registration requirements. Generally speaking, an exempt offering can proceed
much more quickly and at substantially less cost than a registered
offering. These time and cost savings can be critical to
members of the same political party, and ...[n]o commissioner shall engage in any
other business, vocation, or employment ....).
10. On the federal level, the issuer's registration obligation is mandated by section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994). On the state level, a
similar obligation, referred to as a "qualification," is imposed by California's Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110 (West 1977 & Supp. 1997).
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the success of the proposed financing, especially for the small issuer.
Considerable differences do exist, however, in the registration
and exemption provisions of the various blue sky statutes as compared to the corresponding requirements imposed at the federal
level under the terms of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act).'
These differences are largely the product of fundamental philosophical differences between federal and state law in the area of
securities regulation.
At the federal level, the 1933 Act is primarily a disclosure
statute, 2 whereas many state blue sky statutes, including California's, rely on merit regulation.13 Merit regulation--or merit review-is the term used to describe the standard of review employed by many state securities administrators to evaluate the
terms of an issuer's proposed offering of securities in that state.
The purpose of this merit review is to determine whether the terms
and manner of sale under the proposed offering are "fair, just and
equitable" to prospective investors in that state. 14 Thus, "[m]erit
11. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
12. The SEC insists that the issuer provide prospective investors with full and
adequate disclosure of all material facts regarding its proposed offering of securities.
See generally 1 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 25-28 (3d ed. 1995) (citing the failure of underwriters and securities
dealers to provide information to prospective investors as one of the primary factors
leading to legislative regulatory reform efforts). State blue sky statutes also generally insist on full disclosure of all material facts as the basis for their local regulatory
scheme. See generally id. at 92-109 (describing the range of statutory registration requirements imposed by those state blue sky statutes mandating registration of securities). However, many states, such as California, go beyond a standard of full disclosure and also apply a merit standard of review, thereby allowing state administrators
the opportunity to examine the fairness of the terms of a proposed offering. See id.
at 107-09; see also infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (describing the exercise
of merit review).
13. California has long been regarded as one of the leading examples of a merit
jurisdiction. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 1.03[5], at 1-17 ("It is fair to state
that the overwhelming significance of securities regulation in the State of California
has been through the 'fair, just and equitable' standard .... ").
14. Id. § 8.01[1], at 8-5 (Since 1913, "California has followed a substantive system
of regulation of the offer and sale of securities through the requirement that such
offer or sale may be effected only if found by the Commissioner of Corporations to
be 'fair, just and equitable."'). The current formulation of California's merit review
standard is contained in three sections of the Corporate Securities Law of 1968,
namely sections 25140, 25141, and 25151. See id. The most extensive treatment of
this standard is contained in California Corporations Code § 25140, which provides:
The Commissioner may issue a stop order denying effectiveness to, or suspending or revoking the effectiveness of, any qualification of an underwritten offering of securities... if he or she finds that the order is in the public
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review refers to the discretion of a state securities commissioner to
make qualitative decisions regarding the 'merits' of an offering or
sale of securities in that state."'" Merit review statutes therefore
vest state securities administrators with considerable discretionary
authority, 6 the exercise of which can result in a substantial restructuring of the proposed securities offering, including changes to
such fundamental aspects as price, the number of units offered,
and the manner of distribution.
The substantial difference in focus between the federal
disclosure standard and California's merit review standard was
dramatically emphasized in recent federal legislation reforming
federal securities laws. 17 This recent federal reform legislation
made changes to, among other things, the requirements imposed
by the 1933 Act on the capital formation process. 8 This federal
legislative reform effort, which, coincidentally, Congress passed on
the eve of California's Joint Hearing,' 9 had two primary goals

interest and that the proposed plan of business of the issuer or the proposed
issuance or sale of securities is not fair, just, or equitable, or that the issuer
does not intend to transact its business fairly and honestly, or that the securities proposed to be issued or the method to be used in issuing them will
tend to work a fraud upon the purchaser thereof.
CAL. CORP. CODE

§ 25140(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997).

15. Kim M. Robak, What to Do with Merit Review, 65 NEB. L. REV. 413, 414
(1986). For a discussion of the potential scope of merit regulation, see Conrad G.
Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements?, 1976 Wis. L.
REV. 79; Jeffrey T. Haughey & Kevin M. Veler, Empirical Research Project,Blue Sky
Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New Importance for an Old Battleground, 7 J.
CORP. L. 689 (1982); Richard B. Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 899 (1982); Ernest W. Walker & Beverly Bailey Hadaway, Merit Standards
Revisited: An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Efficacy of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J. CORP.
L. 651 (1982); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REV. 495 (1984).
16. See James S. Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New Business Promotions,
1969 DUKE L.J. 273, 274 n.3 ("Such wide discretion on the part of [state securities]
administrators borders on being absolute in practice. . . ."); see also Gregory Gorder,
Comment, Compromise Merit Review-A Proposalfor Both Sides of the Debate, 60
WASH. L. REV. 141, 143 (1984) ("Nearly all states allow the securities administrator
much discretion in deciding to deny registration.").
17. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104290, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3416.
18. See id.
19. This important piece of federal legislation was signed by the President on
October 11, 1996. See id. at 3924. The National Securities Markets Improvement
Act of 1996 amended four of the seven federal securities laws: Securities Act of
1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Investment Company Act of 1940, and Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
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(1) to improve mutual fund regulation by, among
other things, preempting some state regulation
and thereby substantially consolidating regulatory
authority of the mutual fund industry at the federal level;20 and
(2) to reallocate responsibility between state and
federal securities regulators by carving out defined roles for federal and state authorities.
This second legislative objective-to define distinct and separate roles for state and federal regulators-is most relevant to the
subject matter of the Joint Hearing. In drafting this major piece of
reform legislation, Congress was seeking to promote investment by
minimizing the issuer's cost of raising capital without compromising the historic commitment of federal securities law to investor
protection. 22 Over the years, Congress became increasingly concerned that this nation's system of dual state and federal regulation of securities transactions yielded duplicative and overlapping
regulatory requirements. 3
A similar set of concerns served as the genesis for the California Senate and Assembly committees to conduct an investigative hearing last November. The essential purpose of this Joint
Hearing was to investigate and evaluate the continuing effectiveness of the current regulatory requirements that California blue
sky law imposes on the capital formation process in this state.24
20. See H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16 (1996).
21. See id. (the legislation "designat[es] the Federal government as the exclusive
regulator of national offerings of securities"). This reallocation was meant to address the problem of duplicative federal and state securities regulation, which resulted in higher costs to securities issuers without any commensurate protection to
investors or markets. See id.

22. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 2, 48 Stat.
881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994)) (discussing the reasons for the securities exchange regulations which include "the remov[al of] impediments to and perfect[ion
of] the mechanisms of a national market system," "the safeguarding of securities and

funds related thereto," and "the maintenance of fair and honest markets"); H.R.
CoNF. REP. No. 104-864, at 39 (1996) (discussing how prior to the 1996 National Securities Markets Improvements Act, the prevailing regulatory scheme led to increased costs on the issuers of securities without "providing commensurate protec-

tion to investors or 0 markets").
23. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-864, at 39 (1996); D. Ruder & D. Goelzer, An
Overview of the National SecuritiesMarkets Improvement Act of 1996, 24TH ANNUAL
SEC. REG. INST. (vol. 1, Jan. 1997).
24. See STAFF OF SENATE FINANCE, INVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND ASSEMBLY BANKING AND FINANCE COMMITTEE, CAPITAL FLOWS AND LEAKY
BUCKETS: REGULATION OF SECURITIES IN CALIFORNIA 1

(Oct. 26, 1996) [hereinafter
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The starting point in any comprehensive evaluation of Cali-

fornia's blue sky statute, however, must be an assessment of
whether the prevailing merit review approach remains the most effective regulatory philosophy, particularly in light of significant

developments both in the regulatory environment and the world's
financial markets over the past three decades. These changes are
examined in the next Part.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS THAT UNDERMINE
MERIT REGULATION

This Part addresses an important and fundamental issue that

must be resolved as a threshold matter when considering any proposal to reform California's blue sky law: is there any continued,
meaningful role for merit review, theyphilosophical cornerstone of
California's existing blue sky statute? Specifically, we must ask if
the costs imposed on an issuer's capital formation process in complying with California's current regulatory requirements yield sufficient benefits in the form of protecting our state's investors
against fraudulent securities offerings or if there is a more costeffective way to provide adequate protection to investors in this
state.
The Staff Briefing Paper prepared for the Joint Hearing described the dramatic changes that have taken place in capital markets over approximately the last fifteen years. According to this

briefing paper, technological advances have had a substantial impact on both domestic and global capital markets.27 Technology
has unleashed competitive forces that have compelled federal and

The Staff Briefing Paper was prepared principally by John
Decker, senior consultant to the Senate Finance Committee in preparation for the
Joint Hearing. Decker is to be commended for the outstanding quality of this Staff
Briefing Paper.
25. For a general description of the scope of merit regulation, see supra notes 1417 and accompanying text.
26. See STAFF BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 24, at 24-26. These changes include
the following: (1) the widespread use of information technology that accompanied
the explosive growth in trading volume on our national exchanges as well as the
dramatic growth in over-the-counter trading that accompanied the further development of the NASDAQ/NMS; (2) the integration of regional and national financial
markets as well as the flow of capital internationally; (3) the changing nature of equity needs and the trend from debt to equity financing; (4) the potential for greater
political interest in directing capital; and (5) federal regulatory changes. See id. at 24.
27. See id. Such advances include widespread access to personal computers and
the Internet, as well as increased reliance on high-speed computers allowing for a
greater volume of securities trading. See id.
STAFF BRIEFING PAPER].
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state regulators alike to respond through rule-making initiatives
aimed at the regulatory burdens imposed on the capital-formation
process. These regulatory initiatives have helped to maintain the
vitality and preeminence of our nation's capital markets in the
global marketplace.
In addition to the impact of these technological developments,
several legal changes at both the state and federal levels over the
last fifteen years have substantially reduced the impact of merit
regulation in California. This Part will describe briefly two of the
more important of these legal developments first and will then
conclude by discussing the impact of these developments on business interests in this state as well as on California investors. This
Part concludes that all currently available evidence establishes that
California's merit review standard has been of declining significance for at least the last fifteen years and further is of no relevance in regulating modern financial markets.
A. State-Level Development of the Marketplace Exemption
The first legal change to be addressed is the development of
the marketplace exemption in California.u The impact of this important exemption on decreasing the importance of merit regulation cannot be overstated. Moreover, it bears emphasizing that
this exemption was originally created by the states as the product
of their ongoing concern for modernizing blue sky laws.29
As originally formulated, the marketplace exemption provided for a complete exemption from the requirements of state
level registration for any offering of an issuer's securities where
such securities were listed for trading on either of the country's
two preeminent national exchanges, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). 0 The
exemption was later made available to securities listed or desig28. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25100(o) (West 1977 & Supp. 1997). For a general
background and description of the origins and further evolution of this important
California exemption, see MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 4.03, at 4-30.6(10) to
-30.8. A similar form of exemption has been implemented in other states as well.

See generally Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Status of the Marketplace Exemption
from State Securities Registration, 41 Bus. LAW. 1511 (1986) (surveying the recent
developments affecting the marketplace exemption from state registration).
29. Interestingly enough, this brainchild of state origin has been enacted at the

federal level as part of the legislation Congress passed on the eve of the Joint Hearing. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290,
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3416.
30. See California Dep't of Corp. Release No. 27-C (Mar. 4, 1972).
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nated for listing on a national securities exchange. More recently,
the marketplace exemption was expanded to exclude from the
merit review process any issuer's offering of securities designated
or approved for designation as a National Market System security
on the National Association of Securities Dealers Automatic Quotation System/National Market System (NASDAQ/NMS). 32 The
overall effect of this marketplace exemption has been to reduce
substantially the number of offerings by larger issuers that are
made subject to merit review in California.
More importantly, the Commissioner's decision to expand the
marketplace exemption to include NASDAQ/NMS-traded securities evidences the DOC's increasing confidence in the quality of
the trading markets in general and in the regulatory improvements
made in the standards administered by the self-regulatory organizations (SROs), including the enhanced listing requirements imposed by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
for trading on the NASDAQ/NMS.33 The states's initiative in developing and expanding this marketplace exemption also reflects
the increasing level of confidence that the states, including Cali31. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 4.03, at 4-30.6(12) to -30.7 (describing
scope of California's marketplace exemption, § 25100(o), to include issuance of additional shares of a class of stock that was already listed for trading on a national securities exchange certified by the DOC).
32. See California Dep't of Corp. Release No. 87-C (rev. Oct. 8, 1993).
33. See generally MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 4.03, at 4-30.6(11) to (12)
(noting that, pursuait to § 25100(o), the Commissioner has presently certified for
listing NASDAQ/NMS as well as the NYSE, AMEX, Tier I of the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange, and Tier I of the Pacific Stock Exchange). With respect to SROs,
the regulatory structure that Congress imposed on the domestic financial markets in
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) contemplated a cooperative regulatory system that embraced SEC oversight of SROs, which included the major securities exchanges registered under section 6 of the 1934 Act such as the NYSE and the
AMEX, as well as the NASD, which is registered under section 15A of the 1934 Act
and which serves as the principal regulator of the over-the-counter market. For further discussion of the nature of this cooperative regulatory system and the allocation
of responsibilities between the SEC and the SROs, see generally Richard W. Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 663 (1964); David A. Lipton, Governance of Our Securities Markets and the Failure to Allocate Regulatory
Responsibility, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 397 (1985); Therese H. Maynard, What Is an
"Exchange?"-ProprietaryElectronic Securities Trading Systems and the Statutory
Definition of an Exchange, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 833 (1992); Sam Scott Miller,
Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A CriticalExamination, 42 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 853 (1985); Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in
the Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for Accommodation, 62
N.C. L. REV. 475 (1984).
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fornia, now place in the SEC's review of the quality and adequacy
of the disclosures contained in the issuer's registration statement.
Thus, well before Congress's recent codification of the marketplace exemption, California, along with many other states, had
moved to adopt and then later expand the scope of the marketplace exemption. More importantly though, the evolution of this
exemption, particularly in California, clearly demonstrates the increased willingness on the part of California's regulators to rely on
SEC enforcement of the requirements of the federal securities
laws. Such reliance reflects the belief that federal securities laws
offer an adequate measure of protection to investors in this state,
in lieu of the DOC conducting a merit review of the issuer's proposed offering. The DOC's increased confidence in the SEC's
administration of the disclosure standard imposed on the issuer
under federal securities law is particularly noteworthy since this
disclosure philosophy is markedly different from California's merit
review philosophy."
In sum, the development of the marketplace exemption, and
particularly the expansion of this exemption to include
NASDAQ/NMS securities, reflects the increased confidence that
California now places in both the SROs' oversight of the markets
and the offering process as well as in the adequacy of the federal
disclosure standard as enforced by the SEC.
B. Federaland State Expansion of the PrivatePlacement
Exemption
The declining significance of merit review is likewise reflected
in refinements California has made to the private offering exemption. The first step in the modern development of the private offering exemption was taken in 1982 by the SEC when it adopted
Regulation D" as a major reform initiative directed at the private
placement market. Regulation D was intended to reduce the capital formation costs of both large and small issuers, while balancing
the other competing objectives of the federal securities laws-

34. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing Congress's adoption of
the national marketplace exemption).
35. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing how at the federal
level, the Federal Securities Act of 1933 protects investors by mandating full and
adequate disclosure of all material facts in order to promote informed investment
decisions).
36. See Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1996).
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protection of the investing public. 37
While Regulation D continued to evolve at the federal level,

the states, including California, 38 responded by promulgating statelevel exemptions for limited offerings that were intended to coordinate with the federal level exemptions contained in Regulation
D. In an effort to simplify and streamline the requirements for exempting limited offerings at the state level, the North American
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) 39 promulgated
the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE) in 1983.40
NASAA developed the ULOE as a standardized form of statelevel exemption intended to coordinate substantially with Regulation D.4 1 Since NASAA's adoption of the ULOE is not binding on
37. See id.
38. In California the limited offering exemption is found in California Corporations Code section 25102(0. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(0 (West 1977 & Supp.
1997). For a general description of the development of the limited offering exemption available under California blue sky law, see MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, §
4.02A, at 4-23 to -24.
Since Regulation D was adopted in March 1982, other states have been pressured to modify existing exemptions-or adopt new exemptions-in order to better
align the state scheme of limited offering exemptions with the new streamlined federal exemptions under Regulation D. For example, California did not have an exemption for limited offering transactions until November 1981, when section
25102(0 became effective. As originally promulgated, the terms of section 25102(0
were very different from Regulation D or the ULOE. See generally MARSH & VOLK,
supra note 1, § 4.02A[1][a], at 4-23 to -24 (discussing the history of California's limited offering exemption). However, since 1982 California has gradually modified the
terms of the section 25102(0 exemption in order to bring the state exemption more
into conformance with the requirements of Regulation D, although significant differences between these exemptions remain. See FRIEDMAN, 1 CAL. PRACTICE
GUIDE-CORPS.

§ 5:256 (Rutter Group 1996).

39. NASAA is the oldest and largest association of state regulators. See
Goodkind, supra note 15, at 85. It is comprised of securities regulators from 65 jurisdictions located in the United States, Puerto Rico, Canada, and Mexico. NASAA
Rep. (CCH) J 1, at 11 (Mar. 1993). NASAA has been responsible for promulgating
a number of statements of policy. See id. T 351 (defining a statement of policy as "a
statement of general and prospective applicability to implement, interpret or prescribe model laws, regulations, forms or policies pertaining to investor protection
and securities regulation."). However, the terms of any such NASAA statement of
policy assume the force of law only if adopted at the individual state level. See generally id. (discussing the procedures for the adoption of NASAA statements of policy); Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalismand the Dynamics of Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 248 (1990) [hereinafter
Sargent, The New Regulation D].
40. See NASAA Rep. (CCH) 6201, at 6101-05 (May 1989).
41. See Therese H. Maynard, The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption: How
"Uniform" is "Uniform"?-An Evaluation and Critique of the ULOE,36 EMORY L.J.
357,381 (1987); Sargent, The New Regulation D, supra note 39, at 248.
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its individual state members, each state administrator must decide
whether to adopt the ULOE as promulgated by NASAA or to
modify the terms of the ULOE prior to the adoption of this statelevel coordinating exemption. 42
Not surprisingly, many states modified the terms of the ULOE
before adopting some form of Regulation D coordinating exemption,43 thereby increasing the issuer's transaction costs in raising investment capital. 44 Ironically, the promulgation of the ULOE-an
exemption largely intended to relieve the issuers' burden, particularly the burden on small issuers-has not realized its desired goal
of uniformity because of the numerous piecemeal changes made
by the states.4 Generally speaking, states deviated from the specific terms of the ULOE in order to customize the terms of their
form of limited offering exemption primarily as a result of the fundamental differences in regulatory philosophy between these
42. See Sargent, The New Regulation D, supra note 39, at 248.
43. See id. at 249. There is very little interpretive authority available with respect to the states' decisions either to adopt the ULOE or to vary its terms prior to
adoption. This is not surprising, however, since it is generally acknowledged that
there is very little authority in the form of administrative releases or opinions interpreting the provisions of state blue sky laws, and there is a paucity of judicial decisions interpreting state blue sky laws. See Mofsky, supra note 16, at 274 n.3; Mark A.
Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities, 46 MD. L. REv. 1027, 1028 (1987) [hereinafter Sargent, State DisclosureRegulation] ("[Another] source of confusion is the relative inaccessibility of information
about how state disclosure regulation works."). Additionally, the proper interpretation of and differences among the states' blue sky laws are "difficult to survey and
catalog, not only because of the nuances of wording employed in various statutory
and administrative code provisions, but also because many states employ informal
registration standards which are essentially unwritten and/or inconsistently applied."
Goodkind, supra note 15, at 85.
44. See Mark A. Sargent, A Futurefor Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 471,497
(1993) [hereinafter Sargent, A Future] ("The additional legal fees derived from managing compliance with blue sky law do not outweigh a widespread frustration with a
system seen as costly, duplicative, superfluous, and highly annoying to manage.").
45. The modifications made by the states are realized generally at the expense of
small issuers. In determining compliance with relevant state provisions for a limited
offering exemption, the issuer's analysis of the states' varying requirements for this
exemption is generally approached by examining these requirements on a state-bystate basis, which can often add considerably to the issuer's cost of capital formation,
thereby disproportionately burdening the small issuer's effort to raise capital. See
generally J. WILLIAM HICKS, LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTIONS: REGULATION D §§
9.01-.06 (1996-97 ed.) (surveying state blue sky laws and their coordination with the
federal exemption scheme); A. Michael Hainsfurther, Summary of Blue Sky Exemptions Correspondingto Regulation D, 38 Sw. L.J. 989 (1984) (discussing the various
exemptions of the fifty states); Maynard, supra note 41, at 398-442 (discussing various state filing requirements).
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states and the federal disclosure standard.4
Despite these numerous complications in developing a standardized form of limited offering exemption coordinated at both
the state and federal levels, the private placement market nonetheless has grown into a viable and attractive alternative to registration.47 Private placements allow issuers to avoid the cost and delay
inherent in the registration process. Thus, to the extent that capital can be raised outside of the scrutiny of merit review, all issuers
benefit, including small-business interests who make relatively
small offerings as well as the rather more substantial offerings
made by larger issuers.
Indeed, the limited offering exemption was developed in California and in other states as a way of responding to pressure from
small-business interests4' Small issuers in particular complained
bitterly that the cost of complying with California's merit review
standard in order to register their securities offerings for sale in
this state substantially raised their capital formation costs. These
issuers, therefore, maintained that the merit review process as
applied in California disproportionately impacted the smallbusiness issuer's efforts to raise capital.
Consequently, small
businesses complained about the unfairness of subjecting offerings
by small issuers to merit regulation while implementing a market46. Although little interpretive authority exists, it is generally acknowledged that
states have modified the ULOE prior to adopting it in order to make the terms of
the exemption comply with their own regulatory philosophy-the protection of investors in accordance with the merit standard of review. See Securities Act Release
No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 84,910 (CCH) $ 83,106
(Mar. 8, 1982) ("Because of differences between federal and state securities regulation, complete uniformity may not be an attainable objective."); Michael J. Halloran
& Robert Linderman, CoordinatingState SecuritiesLaws with Regulation D and Federal IntegrationPolicy: State Limited Offering Exemptions and Integration Standards,
in STATE REGULATION OF CAPITAL FORMATION AND SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 155,
164-65 (D. Goldwasser & H. Makens eds., 1983).
47. As noted by one commentator:
The "blue skying" of a Regulation D offering can be an extensive and timeconsuming enterprise, but most states have adopted coordinating rules that
allow limited and private offerings exempted under Regulation D to be exempted at the state level and hence to escape state registration and the
application of merit standards.
Sargent, A Future,supra note 44, at 477.
48. See id. ("Much as the marketplace exemption has removed many of the
larger offerings from [the scrutiny of state administrators applying merit review standards, the] ULOE has carved out offerings at the opposite end of the scale.").
49. See id. at 475 ("The net result is that larger public offerings, including initial
public offerings as well as virtually all offerings by issuers already public, receive essentially no scrutiny from the blue sky regulators.").
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place exemption that had the effect of removing most offerings by
larger, more well-established issuers from the scope of merit
regulation. Moreover, legitimate business concerns, small and
large alike, pointed to California's time-consuming and expensive
regulatory requirements as further evidence that California's burdensome regulations were driving business interests out of state.51
As a direct result of the further refinement and expansion
over the last fifteen years of California's exemptions for private
placements, many, if not most, offerings by small issuers have now
been removed from the scope of California's merit review process
since they are no longer required to be registered at the state
level.52 Similarly, from the perspective of larger, established business interests, the combined effect of California's adoption and
subsequent efforts to refine both the marketplace exemption and
the private placement exemption has been to remove most larger
offerings53 from the scope of merit review by state regulators.
C. The Impact of These Legal Changes on California'sIssuers and
Investors
In developing these exemptions, California's policymakers
never lost sight of an important and long-standing objective of this
state's blue sky statute, the protection of California investors. Instead, specific requirements were included as part of the terms of
both of these exemptions, requirements that were intended to
protect investors in this state. For example, the marketplace exemption extends only to securities listed with NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ/NMS and does not extend to securities listed for trading on the other national or regional exchanges- 4 This limitation
was imposed because California's regulators did not have the same
level of confidence in the SROs' oversight of these other exchanges nor in the quality of the issuer-listing criteria imposed by
50. See id. at 483.
51. See STAFF BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 24, at 25 (noting that state regulatory
requirements which deviate from federal disclosure standards "may be seen as onerous to a foreign issuer and become an incentive to sell outside of California").
52. "To some degree, the SEC may have deferred regulation of limited and private offerings to the caprices of state securities administrators, but through its support for coordinating state exemptions it did not abandon such offerings to the rigors
of merit regulation-the most stringent aspect of state regulation." Sargent, A Future, supra note 44, at 477.

53. Such larger offerings include initial public offerings as well as public offerings
and private placements undertaken by established companies.

54. See Sargent, A Future,supra note 44, at 474-75.
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these other exchanges. 55

On the other hand, in developing California Corporations
Code § 25102(f)-California's form of limited offering exemption
intended to coordinate with Regulation D at the federal level-the

state took a slightly different approach in addressing its investorprotection concerns. 6

Probably the most significant investor-

protection requirement that California blue sky law imposes on
the private placement exemption is the suitability standard contained in § 25102(f)(2).
While California's formulation of the suitability requirement
is fairly typical of the form used in other states' exemptions, it does
not coordinate completely with the more relaxed federal standard
set out in Rule 506 of Regulation D., Although they differ in their
specific requirements, the states generally tend to be more protective of their investors by imposing a stricter suitability standard
than that required under Rule 506. ss For example, the standard
imposed by many states allows a presumption of suitability where
the investor satisfies a net worth determination set out in an administrative regulation.59 Many states further qualify the investor's
determination of net worth, however, by excluding from this calcu-

lation the value of the investor's primary residence, which is often
the single most valuable asset held by a prospective investor.

The

primary justification for this standard seems to be rooted in the paternalistic nature of merit regulation: investors should not put at
risk the most important asset in their personal estate. Many inves55. See supra Part III.A (discussing the development of California's marketplace
exemption).
56. See supra note 38 (giving a general description of the development of California Corporations Code § 25102(f)'s limited offering exemption).
57. See Commodities and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1996).
Over the years since California Corporations Code § 25102(f) was first adopted,
California's Corporations Commissioners have gradually moved this state's formulation of the suitability standard into greater conformance with the standard imposed
under Regulation D at the federal level. As a result of these piecemeal administrative reforms implemented through the exercise of rule-making authority delegated to
the Commissioner, California's suitability standard has today been brought into substantial conformance with the federal standard as formulated under Rule 506 of
Regulation D. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.102.13 (1996).
58. These variations and others in the terms of state limited offering provisions
have been the subject of widespread criticism. See Maynard, supra note 41, at 36263; Mark A. Sargent & Hugh H. Makens, ULOE: New Hope, New Challenge, 45
Bus. LAW. 1319, 1319-21 (1990).
59. See Maynard, supra note 41, at 453-54.
60. For a general discussion of the various forms of suitability standards, see id.
at 449-58.
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tors-especially small investors--complain, however, that this
standard leaves them unable to participate in many very lucrative
investment opportunities because of their failure to satisfy the net
worth criteria or to otherwise demonstrate their suitability in satisfaction of the relevant state standard. Small investors, therefore,
complain on fairness grounds about the terms of the suitability requirement as implemented by the DOC Commissioner because it
limits many lucrative investments to wealthy individuals. 62
Notwithstanding the fact that the development of these exemptions from the obligation to register the issuer's proposed securities offering does result in shrinking the opportunity for the
DOC to conduct a merit review of such offerings, these legal
changes do not provide any cause for alarm. Rather, the legal
changes previously described were implemented by the states to
accommodate both the market and legal forces that have shaped
the rapid pace of change and growth in our domestic capital markets over the last fifteen years. As such, these regulatory efforts to
modernize the requirements of state blue sky laws simply evidence
the rather obvious conclusion that merit regulation has been rendered irrelevant in light of the structure and operation of modern
capital markets.
IV. THE CASE FOR ELIMINATING MERIT REGULATION
These legal changes, including the specific regulatory responses described in the last section, evolved piecemeal over time.
Each regulatory response, however, demonstrates the Commissioner's ongoing commitment to reach an appropriate balance between the needs of legitimate businesses, both large and small, to
raise capital in a cost-effective fashion while simultaneously protecting California investors from fraudulent securities offerings.
Nonetheless, piecemeal regulatory reform efforts over the last fifteen years by DOC commissioners, both past and current, do implicitly recognize that merit review is of declining importance.
This does not mean that California has abandoned our state's
61. See iL at 452-53.

62. Such criticisms may have been blunted somewhat by the exemptive authority
conferred on the SEC by Congress in the National Securities Markets Improvement
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3416. Any generalizations, however, as to the impact of this federal legislation on the terms of statelevel limited offering exemptions remain uncertain, at least until such time as the

SEC decides to exercise the rule-making authority delegated to it under section 102
of the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996.
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investors. Rather, the Commissioner's regulatory responses simply reflect that merit review has outlived its usefulness as the
guiding principle for regulating securities transactions in this state.
And, the time has now come for the California legislature to make
express that which is implicitly reflected in California's modern
regulatory framework: merit review is no longer the guiding
regulatory premise of this state's blue sky law.
Therefore, this state's securities law should be amended to reflect that California-like many other states-has responded to
changes in the capital markets by adopting new and different approaches to regulating offers and sales of securities within this
state. This type of reform effort, however, should not be interpreted as legislative abandonment of this state's long-standing
commitment to reach an appropriate regulatory balance between
the capital formation needs of legitimate business interests and the
investor-protection goals that have historically been the cornerstone of our state's securities laws.
Instead, it is my view that our state government owes this degree of candor to the business interests of this state as well as to
California investors. Indeed, I believe the state's failure to candidly acknowledge that merit review has become irrelevant to the
state's ongoing efforts to regulate the modern capital markets actually does a disservice to both California issuers and investors.
While other states have abandoned merit regulation, 3 many of the
participants in our nation's capital markets continue to regard
California as a merit review jurisdiction. To the extent California
continues to be labeled a merit review state, however, we send the
wrong signal to the business community because we are indicating
to prospective issuers that California is more hostile to business interests than in fact the state's current regulatory environment
really is.
Furthermore, we are sending the wrong signal to investors in
this state as well. By continuing to hold our state out as a merit
review jurisdiction, we are suggesting to investors in this state that
63. For example, both Illinois and Louisiana have reformed their state's blue sky
laws and in the process have eliminated any further efforts to regulate based on
merit review. See Sargent, A Future,supra note 44, at 480; Sidney Sosin & Roger G.
Fein, The Landmark 1983 Amendments to the Illinois Securities Law, 72 ILL. B.J. 196

(1983) (discussing changes to Illinois blue sky laws); American Bar Ass'n Ad Hoc
Subcomm. on Merit Regulation, State Regulation of Securities Comm., Report on
State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAW. 785, 786 (1986)
(discussing changes to Louisiana blue sky laws).

June 1997]

REFORMING CALIFORNIA'S BLUE SKY LAW

1549

there is a greater level of paternalism and protection than in fact
exists under the state's current regulatory framework. Indeed,
many investors may be encouraged to rely on the Commissioner
for a greater measure of protection than the state can actually
provide-even if the Commissioner were to administer a fairly
stringent system of merit review. 64
In the final analysis, I worry that conveying this misleading
impression to California investors may cultivate a false sense of security on their part whereby they expect the Commissioner to be
able to prevent fraudulent securities offerings .from occurring before any California investors lose their hard-earned life savings to
some unscrupulous promoter. Moreover, this kind of false sense
of security may actively discourageinvestors in this state from diligently protecting their own best financial interests, which is exactly
contrary to what should be expected of investors in this state, especially in light of the rapid pace of change occurring in the
world's financial markets.
Moreover, this pace of change only promises to accelerate,
further increasing the complexity of the financial markets and the
products they offer for sale to prospective investors. For example,
even as this Commentary is being written, the forces of the Internet are about to be unleashed on the world's capital markets. The
impact of this technology on the continuing relevance of the established state and federal framework for securities regulation was
reflected recently in the experiences of Spring Street Brewing Co.
In early 1996, Spring Street Brewing Co., a microbrewery business,
sought to use the technology of the Internet to make a direct, online offering of its securities to prospective investors without the
assistance of a broker-dealer or other financial intermediary. 65
This issuer's efforts to harness the forces of modem technology in
order to raise investment capital forced the SEC to confront the
continuing relevance of the 1933 Act's regulatory approach as
applied to public offerings made through the media of modern

64. See STAFF BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 24, at 28. Critics of the merit review
system contend that "the likely success of an issuer (and the investment) depends on
matters that California's merit standards do not address: Is the product any good?
Is there a market demand for the issuer's products? What are the competitive
forces? How good is management?" Id.
65. Udayan Gupta, Microbrewery Uses the Internetto Post Circularon Its IPOSpring Street Brewing Co. Turns to Novel Tool in Seeking to Sell $5 Million in Stock,
WALLST. J., Feb. 24, 1996, at B5.
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telecommunications and related computer technology."
This rapid pace of change is an inevitable development that no
one-neither the state of California nor the SEC-can stop. Before long, indeed if not already, the State of California, like the
SEC, will have to confront the regulatory issues posed by the Internet and the other modem forces of technological change. In the
face of such powerful agents of change, the only sensible regulatory approach for our state to adopt as we move into the twentyfirst century is to encourage investor diligence and not to continue
fostering the notion that the state can prevent fraudulent offerings
from occurring through the exercise of merit regulation.
For these reasons, I urge the California Legislature to reform
California's blue sky statute to eliminate merit review as the philosophical foundation for this state's regulation of the capital formation process. This recommendation, however, does not imply any
suggestion that state securities regulation has been rendered completely irrelevant or obsolete. The next Part briefly outlines the
important role blue sky regulation should assume as we move toward the twenty-first century.
V. THE FUTURE OF CALIFORNIA BLUE SKY LAW: ENHANCED
ENFORCEMENT AND EDUCATION EFFORTS

In considering the general question of the future of state blue
sky regulation, California, as well as other states, must recognize
that it cannot prevent securities fraud altogether. Rather, all that
our state regulators can do is make every effort to minimize the
incidence of securities fraud and rigorously enforce penalties for
such fraud when it does occur. Furthermore, California's investors
66. See id.; SEC Halts Bid to Trade Brewer's Stock on Internet, WALL ST. J., Mar.
21, 1996, at B6; Jeffrey Taylor, SEC Says Brewery May Use Internet to Offer Its
Stock, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1996, at C1. For another recent example of the complications created by introducing the forces of the Internet into the capital formation
process, consider the difficulties experienced in the case of Wired, Inc.'s proposed
public offering in late 1996. The technology of e-mail distribution was inadvertently
used to effect wide dissemination of an e-mail message written by the company's
founder that was intended originally for distribution only to the company's employees. See Deborah Lohse & Joan I. Rigdon, Wired Kills IPO amid Mishap with EMail, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1996, at C1. These developments confounded both the
SEC and the issuer and ultimately resulted in Wired, Inc. withdrawing its proposed
offering. See id. The inadvertent distribution of this e-mail message has convinced
many observers that the SEC will have to reassess the continued vitality of its "gun
jumping" rules in the very near future. Cf. id. (discussing how the company may
have unknowingly run afoul of federal securities law).
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need to be made aware that it is not realistic for them to expect the
state to completely eliminate all incidents of securities fraud. 67
Only when we have acknowledged this inherent limitation on the
general objectives that any form of state blue sky statute can reasonably be expected to accomplish can we realistically assess the
efforts that the state can undertake to achieve the goal of minimizing the incidence of securities fraud in this state.
This Part will describe in very general terms the scope of
regulatory efforts that modem blue sky statutes should adopt in
order to protect investors against the incidence of fraudulent securities offerings.6 This Part will briefly describe the following
three regulatory measures that our state regulators should be
authorized by statute to implement and pursue:
(1) Registrationof certain issuers' offers and sales
of their securities;
(2) Enforcement activity concentrating the state's
efforts on tracking down and punishing promoters
of fraudulent offerings; and
(3) Education of investors so they will be better
equipped to protect themselves from unscrupulous promoters of fraudulent securities offerings.
The remainder of this Part briefly outlines each of these
measures.
A. Registration
First, as to state registration of an issuer's offerings, the
analysis set forth earlier in Part IV regarding the general irrele67. As a direct result of these inherent limitations, it is necessary to educate our
citizens so they understand the need for diligence in managing their financial affairs
and the need to be always alert to the possibility of an unscrupulous promoter
hawking a fraudulent securities offering. See infra Part V.C (further describing the
role of the states in educating our citizens so they are better able to protect themselves in the first instance).
68. This Part describes the future role of state blue sky regulation in quite general terms. In view of the fact that there is no specific proposal currently pending
before the California Legislature, it seems inappropriate at this time to comment on
any specific details to be included in any such reform legislation. Since these hearings are more general in their purpose, I have tried to keep the observations and
suggestions included in this Commentary more general as well. At such future time
as the California Legislature takes up a specific proposal, whether or not it takes the
form of the bill that was introduced last session, A.B. 2465, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 1996), I would welcome the opportunity to offer more specific comments and
suggestions regarding the details of any such reform legislation.
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vance of merit review applies with equal force to any proposal to
expand the registration requirements for issuers' offerings at the
state level." Indeed, expanding the scope of this state's registration requirements based on merit review will do more harm than

good because it will disproportionately impact legitimate business
activity occurring within California by unnecessarily raising the issuer's cost of capital formation. Any proposals for expanding the

scope of California's registration requirements will likely result in
costly duplication of the registration obligations under federal law
and will also result in substantial overlap with other states' registration requirements." Ultimately, legitimate business interests
will most likely migrate out of this merit review state to a more
"user-friendly" regulatory environment to raise necessary capital.7
Avoiding duplicative regulatory efforts becomes all the more

important in light of the fact that legitimate business interests-in
other words, those issuers who make every effort to comply with
state blue sky registration or exemption requirements in order to
make a valid offering in California-are not the primary source of
fraudulent securities offerings. As Professor Harold Marsh, one of
the leading authorities on blue sky regulation, observed during his
testimony at the Joint Hearing, promoters of fraudulent stock of-

ferings usually do not make any effort to comply with the registration or exemption requirements at either the state or federal
69. See supra Part IV (presenting the case for eliminating merit regulation).
Likewise, I do not see much promise in any proposal to expand the opportunity for
the Commissioner to apply a merit review standard, nor do I see any usefulness in
returning to a more strict application of the merit review standard as an effective way
of preventing fraudulent securities offerings in the future. Registration at the state
level, however, may be warranted in the case of those public offerings left primarily
to state regulation by the SEC. The SEC has broad rule-making authority to do so
pursuant to the terms of the recent reform legislation, the National Securities Market
Improvement Act of 1996.
70. See, e.g., Joint Hearingon AB 2465, supra note 5 (testimony of Stuart D. Buchalter, Buchalter, Nemer, Fields & Younger) (transcript on file with the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review); id. (testimony of Jere W. Glover, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration) (transcript on file with the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review).
71. Again, for many of the same reasons described by Buchalter in his testimony-which I will not repeat at length here-expanding the opportunity for, as
well as the scope of, merit review certainly will not result in enhanced protection for
prospective investors in this state, or at least not enough to justify such an expansion
on a cost-benefit basis-in other words, the issuer's cost of compliance will not be
outweighed by a commensurate enhancement of protection for California investors.
See id. (testimony of Stuart D. Buchalter, Buchalter, Nemer, Fields & Younger)
(transcript on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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level.72
Consequently, any effort to expand California's registration or
exemption requirements almost certainly will not eliminate the
great preponderance of securities fraud schemes that target the
unsophisticated, and often elderly, investors of this state.73 Thus,
proposals that call for reform by expanding the scope of California's current merit regulation statute certainly do not represent the
most efficient use of the limited resources available to curb securities fraud in this state. Moreover, such an approach may very well
result in even more devastating consequences for capital formation
in this state by further alienating legitimate business interests.
B. Enforcement
The second category where California could invest its scarce
budgetary resources is enhancement of state enforcement efforts.
Indeed, other commentators have suggested that enhanced enforcement activity at the state level should assume an increasingly
important role in future blue sky regulatory efforts. 74 At the out72. See id. (testimony of Harold Marsh, Professor Emeritus at the University of
California, Los Angeles). For a description of a recent and widely publicized example of the type of fraudulent securities offering that the accompanying text is referring to, see Deborah Lohse & Frances A. McMorris, Big FBI Sting Collars45 PennyStock Figures, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1996, at C1; Jeffrey Taylor, Arrests Highlight
Rise in Small-Stock Schemes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1996, at C1.
As noted by two influential commentators, "the problems at which modern
securities regulation are directed are as old as the cupidity of sellers and the gullibility of buyers." 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 1 (describing the infamous
South Sea Bubble scandal of the 18th Century in England and France wherein John
Law and the South Sea Company fraudulently convinced the British Government to
grant a monopoly on trading with South America and the Pacific Islands in order to
pay off the French and British public debts; it was subsequently discovered that the
venture was nothing more than a scam).
73. Indeed, imposing a registration obligation on an issuer at the state leveleven if it included the opportunity for the Commissioner to apply merit review standards to the terms of the proposed offering--does not guarantee the state will be
able to eliminate all possibility of a fraudulent securities offering.
74. See, e.g., Sargent, A Future, supra note 44, at 473-99 (discussing the challenges facing blue sky laws and their need to adapt radically to major structural
changes in public markets and investing). Enhanced enforcement efforts is not a
novel proposal at the state level. Indeed, all states currently have some form of broker-dealer registration system in place and the vast majority of states require registration of investment advisers as well. See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 6062, 79-92. Moreover, proposals to dedicate more of this state's administrative resources to policing the in-state activities of broker-dealers and investment advisers is
entirely consistent with my recommendation to amend California's blue sky law to
eliminate merit regulation of proposed offerings of securities to California investors.
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set, however, it bears emphasizing that there is currently no evidence available suggesting that existing securities fraud prohibitions of California's blue sky law are somehow inadequate or insufficient to allow the state's aggressive pursuit of promoters of
fraudulent securities offerings. Therefore, this recommendation
does not include any legislative proposals to amend California's
existing antifraud provisions.
The state should invest its scarce regulatory resources to create an enhanced enforcement presence that would deter wrongdoing-something akin to a strong local "cop on the beat" presence.
This enhanced presence would most likely take the form of aggressive investigation and enforcement of the various provisions of
California's blue sky statute and administrative rules in order to
quickly shut down fraudulent schemes before too many investors
fall victim to these unscrupulous promoters. This kind of increased presence should result in greater deterrence of financial
fraud. In addition, these state-level enforcement activities should
include efforts to make California investors more aware of the appropriate state and local offices to contact if they suspect ongoing
investment activity that might possibly involve financial fraud.
Likewise, California issuers should be made aware that the state's
response will be swift and decisive. s
C. Education
Closely related to enhanced enforcement activity is the last of
the three regulatory measures to be implemented in any proposal
By doing so, state regulators will be free to target administrative resources to those

areas which, generally speaking, offer the greatest opportunity for investors in this
state to have direct contact with the investment world, and, as such, offer considerable opportunities for unscrupulous promoters to hawk fraudulent securities investment schemes.

75. Many investors who have lost their money will quite naturally be very upset
and will often angrily demand that their state government officials answer the question, "Where were the regulators?" The state's response has to be that its regulators
cannot eliminate all securities fraud. Once investors are made aware of this inherent

limitation, hopefully their more realistic expectations will temper their anger, or at
least will temper the anger and resentment of the general populace of prospective

investors, who will have been sensitized to appreciate the inherent limitations on any
state's blue sky regulatory efforts. Moreover, aggressive enforcement activity-and

the state's commitment of its budgetary resources to an increased enforcement presence-may ameliorate the inevitable anger on the part of the victims of a fraudulent
securities scheme, while also allowing the state's regulators to legitimately and convincingly maintain that the state did all it could do to prevent the fraudulent securities offering.
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for reform of California's securities laws: increase state efforts to
educate prospective investors. California's regulators should invest in efforts to educate our citizens so they will be able to recognize on their own the tell-tale signs of a fraudulent securities offering.75
This proposal starts from the basic observation that fraudulent
securities investment activity of some variety has been going on
since time immemorial, dating back to well before the time of the
"traveling medicine man show," continuing through today's
"boiler room operations," and extending well into tomorrow's
"chat room on the Internet. ' 77 For example-harking back to a
simpler time-think of the medicine man who hawked a vial of
"hair tonic" guaranteed to restore hair to bald heads. Eventually,
the townspeople realized there was nothing but blue water in the
bottle and, in their anger, would run the traveling medicine man
out of town! In the process they learned a valuable lesson, though
many learned it the hard way. The "traveling medicine man"
eventually would return to town, however, this time hawking some
new "miracle" drug or some new "get rich quick" scheme-or, in
modern context, some new "derivative financial product" that
promises to yield a 300% return in sixty days-and inevitably the
townspeople would fall victim all over again!
Once this reality is recognized, the importance of the state's
enforcement and education efforts becomes apparent. Likewise
apparent is the declining value of allocating scarce regulatory resources to the expansion of state level registration requirementsas well as the accompanying merit review of a proposed securities
offering. Instead, a much bigger "bang" for the "regulatory dollar" is obtained from enhancing the state's enforcement efforts and
educating our investors about who to contact if they suspect financial fraud in a securities offering and how to better protect
themselves and their financial assets.

76. The Staff Briefing Paper prepared by John Decker mentions several suggestions on how to increase the investing public's access to educative materials. Such
suggestions include research partnerships with the state and organizations such as
the American Association of Individual Investors, the National Council of Individual

Investors, and the Mutual Funds Education Alliance. See STAFF BRIEFING PAPER,
supra note 24, at 35-37. Moreover, special efforts may well be in order so as to educate those population groups that over the years have proven to be particularly vulnerable such as senior citizens and recent immigrants.
77. See id. at 24; Gupta, supra note 65, at C1.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Changes in the regulatory framework that have been implemented piecemeal over the last fifteen years have rendered merit
review obsolete as a practical matter. In addition, dramatic
changes in the world's financial markets since 1968 have further
contributed to the substantial erosion of the value of merit regulation. More recently, fairness concerns have assumed greater importance as the costs of compliance with the requirements imposed
by this state's form of merit regulation have been increasingly perceived as disproportionately burdening the capital formation process for small-business interests.
Taken together, all of these developments ultimately serve to
dampen, if not virtually eliminate, the attractiveness of California's
capital markets-to both large and small business interests alikewithout producing any demonstrated enhancement in the protection of this state's investors against fraudulent securities offerings.
Even more importantly, these developments clearly establish that
the time has come for our state legislature to reform California's
blue sky statute.
In conclusion, strong public policy considerations dictate that
the California Legislature should reform this state's blue sky statute to eliminate regulation based on merit review standards.
Commissioner Keith Paul Bishop is to be commended for opening
up this debate by authoring the reform legislation in the Legislature in 1996.78 Although there may be legitimate debate as to specific provisions to be included in any such reform legislation, there
can be no doubt that the California Legislature should undertake a
comprehensive review of the existing blue sky requirements and,
at a minimum, reform California's Corporate Securities Law of
1968 to eliminate merit regulation.

78. See A.B. 2465, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996). Assemblymember Goldsmith introduced Assembly Bill 2465 on February 20, 1996. See STAFF BRIEFING
PAPER, supra note 24, at 11. Commissioner Bishop was the principal drafter of this
reform measure. See id. As this Commentary was going to press, however, Senate
Bill 1205 was introduced by its co-sponsors Bruce McPherson and John Vasconcellos
during the current 1997-1998 session of the California Legislature. See S.B. 1205,
1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996). This most recent piece of blue sky reform legislation contains substantially the same provisions as its predecessor, A.B. 2465.

